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The prompt asked the authors to muse about the phenomenology of  sickness in current 
times. What, it asked, are the possibilities of  a critical phenomenology and where are its limitations? 
This is a question I’ve had for several years. Phenomenology has always been anchored 
in lived experience. It studies what is given in experience—the subjective “inside” of  the 
world—and thus posits a more-or-less stable subject of  experience. In certain moments of  
sickness, phenomenology is certainly a useful lens of  analysis, but I wonder about the limits 
of  starting from lived experience.
Consider chronic pain. Countless times I’ve writhed on the bathroom floor, whimpering 
in pain and waiting with desperation for the world to end. Within periods of  acute pain 
or nausea, the intensity of  lived experience might increase but, for me at least, it takes a 
decidedly anti-futurist turn. Twisted on the floor, I quite literally cannot conceive of  a 
future—a tomorrow or next week beyond the pain. There is no becoming for me nor for 
my place in the world. There is, it seems, only the certain despair of  a self-devouring now. 
Pain is singular and thus disposed to phenomenological analysis. We can speak of  
collective and intergenerational pain, yet pain is still a necessarily subjective phenomenon. 
It pops only at the surface of  consciousness—as if  willing us to acknowledge its power. Pain 
is, in fact, so singular that it eludes both quantitative and qualitative measure. How much pain 
do I have on the bathroom floor? What does a crude proxy like “10” even mean after a decade of  
pain? What does pain feel like? This question is especially tricky since pain is a type of  “non-
experience” (Heyes 2020). If  feeling requires a subject of  experience—one who feels—pain 
reveals the limits of  starting analysis from lived experience. Pain dissembles the habituated 
performance of  social codes and even the human itself. Coiled in the waiting room and 
moaning loudly, an aspect of  “me” knows that “proper humans” do not act this way. But 
the concepts of  me-ness and humanness (each ableist in their own ways) are precisely what 
pain calls into question. In other words, my grasp on the world as a me and a human 
requires an ongoing and coordinated effort that pain disrupts. Pain does not mask my true, 
authentic, self  any more than it exposes a primal self  buried under layers of  habituated 
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social codes. Rather, pain reopens what we think sealed—the ontogeny (beginnings and 
development) of  our subjectivity. 
The cold bathroom floor stages an existential drama on which I thrash between radical 
humanism and radical post-humanism. One moment I hear a voice from my childhood 
cry aloud for Jesus, the next a surge of  pain shatters any illusion that I am a self. Pain raises 
questions that push beyond the perceiving-volitional subject to get at the very nature of  
subject formation. Questions of  despair —Can I project a future? Can I desire a self  in relation 
to that future? How long until I return to this floor?—foreground other existential themes like 
thrownness—Am I predisposed to end up on this floor?—and freedom—Have my own life choices 
cursed me with pain? Am I somehow responsible? —and, of  course, hope. 
Hope is a troubled concept for me these days, but its presence in the long hours on 
the bathroom floor is undeniable. In the midst of  acute pain, hope dons the form of  a 
superhero—God if  you exist I beg you to either rescue or kill me! But more mundanely, when 
thought about from some distance, hope is much less extra-ordinary, much less individual 
and volitional. Hope is the slow endurance of  things. In an affective sense, Jasbir Puar 
explains that hope is “a capacity, emblematic of  a futurity that speaks to the body’s 
tendency to be affected or affecting, its capacity for change, evolution, transformation, and 
movement” (2009, 162). Hope is not heroic; I persist whimpering on the floor not as an 
individual that wills-to-live, but through an ecology of  social and material relations that is 
always open to transformation. What is the phenomenology of  pain, of  becoming undone 
as a self  and then remade? 
If  the non-futurity of  the bathroom floor is one pole of  living with chronic pain, the 
long endurance of  time marks the other. In other words, the experience of  waiting for the 
bathroom floor is the backdrop of  returning there. People experience sickness in drawn-
out intervals of  expectation for appointments, test results, prognoses, medication half-lives, 
relapses, remissions, etc. Citing Sarah Jain’s work on cancer, Puar (2007) notes that under 
a financialized neoliberalism, much of  the Western world lives as patients-in-waiting. This 
is a temporality of  pre-sickness, or “prognosis time,” that is both future-directed—How long 
until I get cancer?—and speculative, replete with statistical probability and risk calculation—
How long until I too get cancer? For Puar, this shift signals a larger move from the practice 
of  governing bodies through normalization to the practice of  optimization. “Neoliberal 
regimes of  biocapital produce the body as never healthy enough,” Puar writes, “and thus 
always in a debilitated state in relation to what one’s bodily capacity is imagined to be” 
(167). Here, the monolithic categories of  ability and disability give way to fluid sites of  
what she calls “capacity” and “debility.” When standards of  health and well-being are 
free-floating, are no longer indexed to social codes, the body becomes a site of  ongoing 
biomedical improvement and optimization. And, as Sunder Rajan states, within the 
neoliberal age of  Big Pharma, Big Data, and therapeutic dominance, we are “patients-
in-waiting” inevitably transformed into “consumers-in-waiting” (2006, 144). Far more value 
and utility can be extracted from a body never-fully-well than from one normalized by the 
categories of  ability and its pathological other.
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There is of  course a phenomenology of  sickness-in-waiting. The lived experience of  
prolonged waiting is akin to what Jay Dolmage describes as abeyance: states of  temporary 
suspension “perhaps allowing for access, but disallowing the possibility of  action for change” 
(2017, 77). Neoliberalism (but not only neoliberalism) constructs disabled people as buffers 
that suffer for the good of  society. The subject of  abeyance is made to endure and suffer 
privately like, to quote Tolkien, butter scraped over too much bread.
Following Puar, the notion of  debility problematizes the subject of  lived experience 
and questions the limits and usefulness of  phenomenology as a conceptual platform. Puar 
questions “the predominance of  subject formation itself, thinking instead of  disability and 
debility in terms of  assemblages” (2009, 167, emphasis added). She invites us to consider the 
body as comprised of  flows that assemble in the mode of  congeniality. As Ada Jaarsma 
writes, “we are ecosystems, not bounded individuals; we are embedded creatures, porous 
and symbiotic participants in complex systems” (2017, 40). Both the phenomena of  chronic 
pain I have discussed—a present that self-annihilates and one out of  joint—resist lived 
experience in their own ways and expose, rather, the ontogeny of  the subject. A critical 
phenomenology of  sickness might thus attend to the unravelings of  lived experience in 
order to bear witness to the vectors of  our becoming. For we are relations—connections 
and disconnections—stitched into time, all the way down. 
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